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V.: Equitable Restrictions--Restrictions as the Use of Land--Statutes
WEST YIRGINIA

LAW

QUARTERLY

The court, in that case, seems to have failed to differentiate between
the true option contract and the contract to purchase land which
grew out of it. It was in that case that the court made the statefment that an option to purchase real estate creates an equitable
interest therein. 1'
The American courts, it is submitted, have adopted the proper
view. In a recent case, 16 the Massachusetts court refused to enforce specifically the performance of a contract giving the optionee an election to purchase real estate at any time within twenty-five years; and, further, the court denied the optionee the right
to recover common-law damages for the breach of the contract, expressly repudiating the doctrine of Worthing Corporation v.
Heather in this respect. The ground on which the court rests its
holding in that case is that the option contract violates the spirit
of the Rule against Perpetuities,'" and, being void in equity, is also void at law. The New Jersey court has also recently reached
the conclusion that the Rule against Perpetuities applies to contract rights as well as to contingent interests in property. 8 It
is submitted that this is the proper view. No cogent reason is seen
why, if a contract relating to land is not specifically enforceable
in equity, a law court ought to allow damages for its breach. The
contract should be considered either valid or void, not void in one
court and valid in another. These contracts should be held void
not because they create interests of any kind in the land to which
they relate, but because they violate the spirit of the Rule. 9
-W. F. K.
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LAND-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-The West Virginia Supreme Court
in two recent decisions' has recognized the validity of certain
agreements creating equitable restrictions upon the use of land.
In both instances these agreements were contained in the deeds
15 [1906] 2 Ch. 532, 536. And see note 5, supra.
Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co.. 128 N. E. 1"77 (Mass. 1920).
27 For an excellent statement of the spirit of the Rule, see the article by Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., "Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuitles," 27 YALE L. J." 885.
Professor Kales says that the option contract. for the purchase of real estate makes
the optionee the dominus of the land, and Is objectionable for that reason. See
KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 665.
-" Canda v. Canda, 113 At]. 503 (N. J. Ch. 1920).
But clearly it does not
apply to all contract rights. See McKenzie v. Chllders, 43 Ch. Div. 265, 279. See
also GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §329.
10 See note 17. supra.
16

I Cole v. Seamons, 104 S. E. 747 (W. Va. 1921) ;Withers v. Ward, 86 W. Va.
558, 104 S E. 96 (1920).
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by which the property was conveyed, and imposed certain restrictions upon the vendee as to the use of the land conveyed. In
neither instance does it appear that the deed was signed by the
vendee, but neither case attempts any explanation as to why
these agreements are not within our Statute of Frauds.2 Today
the validity of such agreements is almost universally recognized;
and in most jurisdictions independent of the mode or incidents of
execution. However, practically none of these cases attempt to
explain why such agreements are not within the Statute of
Frauds. The courts of several states have taken the view that
such agreements create interests in land within the contemplation of the Statute,3 while an equally limited number expressly
take the opposite view.4 There are two decisions denying that
such an agreement is one not to be performed within one year from
the making thereof. One decision is based upon the theory that
there is a possibility that the agreement may be performed within
one year "; the other upon the theory that the provision does not
apply to a negative contract.6 The text writers upon the Statute
of Frauds adopt the view that such agreements are not within
the Statute, but are not accompanied by explanations. 7 It may
be said to be a fairly well settled rule that such agreements are
not within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, but it is regrettable that the cases do not attempt any explanations as to why
-M. T. V.
the Statute of Frauds does not apply.
RAILROADS-DUTY

TO TAKE

PRECAUTION

DOMESTIc ANIMALS NEAR TRACK.-A

TO

train

AvOID INJURY
crew discovered

TO

a

cow about 125 feet ahead and 8 or 10 feet from track and between
it and a slope from which she was eating grass. No effort was made
to check the engine until the cow suddenly wheeled around and got
upon the track 60 feet ahead. Held, whether employes were
negligent is a question for jury determination from all the circumstances. Testerman v. Hines, Director General, 107 S. E. 201,
(W. Va. 1921.)

*

*

W. vA. COD, c. 98 § 1.
Sprazue v. Kimball. 213 Mass. .80, 100 N. E. 622 (1913) : Clanton v. Scruggs,

95 Ala. 279, 10 So. 757 (1892): Rice v'. Roberts, 24 Wis. 461 (1869); Wolfe V.
Frost 4 Snlndf. Ch. 72 iN Y. 1847).
, Hall v. Solomon, 61 Conn. 476, 23 At. 876 (1892) ; Pitman v. Hodge, 67 N. H.
101. 36 Atl. 605 (1892) ; Lelnau v. Smsrt, 11 Humph. 308 (Tenn. 1850); Bostwick v'. Leach, 3 Day 476 (Conn. 1809).
* Hall v. Solom-on, supra.
6
Leinanu v. Smart, .upra.
* See BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDs, 4 'ed.. § 269; SMITi, LAW or Fruns,
§ 3460.
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